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Anesthetic Malpractice in Canada
John H. Harland*
T HE ANESTHESIOLOGIST is perhaps more liable to suit than the
practitioner specializing in other fields, for several reasons.
Firstly, his most prolonged contact with the patient is made while
the latter is asleep. Although there is some opportunity to estab-
lish rapport in the pre- and post-operative visits, the relationship
is necessarily somewhat tenuous. This is further aggravated by
a tendency in the bigger institutions to delegate these duties to
residents or internes. A patient is less likely to sue the doctor
he knows, who has been treating him and his family over a long
period, as compared with one who, for them, hardly exists as a
real person at all.
Secondly, the advances in anesthetic technique have been
such that anesthesia is now relatively safe. Thus, when some-
thing does go wrong, the victim of the accident or his family are
much more likely to ask questions than they were a few years
ago. In the old days, anesthetic deaths were explained away as
"ether allergy," or "status thymo-lymphaticus," diagnoses that
would no longer be considered acceptable. Cardiac arrest was
assumed until quite recently to be an Act of God; it is now
recognized that although not always preventable, it is usually
just to infer that it was caused, rather than that it just hap-
pened. Small comfort though it may be to the defendant anes-
thesiologist, he is, to some extent at least, the victim of his own
success.
Thirdly, as in the "swab" cases, where damage is caused, the
patient-plaintiff can have no knowledge of what transpired, and
the thing or instrumentality which caused the damage being so
completely under the control of the anesthesiologist, it is per-
haps not surprising that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is ap-
plied in many jurisdictions.
The Canadian anesthesiologist, despite all this, is, however,
much less suit-conscious than his contemporary in the United
States. That this happy insouciance is due to greater skill or
fewer accidents may be doubted. It is due in part to the fact
that the Canadian public is not inherently litigious; in part to
the circumstance that counsel do not handle cases on a contin-
gent basis. Such a practice is not only frowned upon by the
Canadian Bar Association as unethical; it would in fact be con-
sidered champertuous. Furthermore, the damages awarded in
personal injury cases in Canada are relatively paltry, judged by
* M.B., B. Ch.; Anesthesiologist, Underhill Clinic, Kelowna, British Colum-
bia, Canada.
Editor's Note: Prof. 0. E. Lang of the University of Saskatchewan College
of Law was kind enough to read the manuscript of this article, and to
approve it as "a very fine job." See also the Comment by Prof. Mewett at
the end of this article.
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other standards; for example in the anesthetic explosion case,
which will be referred to, general and special damages totalled
less than $10,000.00.1
Finally, there is the effect of the way in which anesthetic
malpractice insurance is carried. This will now be gone into.
Professional Malpractice Insurance in Canada
Most Canadian anesthesiologists are members of the Ca-
nadian Medical Protective Association, a non-profit organization,
functioning under the aegis of the Canadian Medical Association.
The Protective Association follows a policy of contesting every
claim, except those which are manifestly indefensible. This dis-
courages the "nuisance" claims, which the commercial under-
writer, taking the short term view, would tend to settle to avoid
costly and protracted litigation.
One leading insurance agent in Illinois who underwrites
malpractice insurance in the United States and Canada offers
insurance to Canadian anesthesiologists at the lower premium
rate, at par with the States of Delaware, Nebraska and Vermont.
The annual premium rates range from $102.00 to $131.00 depend-
ing on coverage, as compared with $461.00 to $547.00 annually
in parts of California.
The premium charged the members by the Protective Asso-
ciation is $20.00 annually, providing what amounts to unlimited
coverage.
It may be of interest to note some further statistics. The
Association has between 10 and 11,000 members. In the year
1959-60, only 22 writs were issued against members. During that
year four cases went to trial, of which one was lost. Eleven
settlements were made. The cost of legal fees and settlements
during the same period amounted to some $65,000.00, but this
figure was greater than usual.
2
To the malpractice insurance underwriter in New York
State or California, Canada may sound like an actuarial paradise.
There is, however, every reason to assume that Canadian phy-
sicians may anticipate a gradual increase in the number of writs
issued against them, following the trend in Great Britain and
the United States.
Some Differences Between the Practice of Anesthesia in Canada
and the United States
The Nurse Anesthetist. In Canada virtually all anesthetics
are administered by doctors, as is the case in Great Britain. In
the latter country nurses deliver infants; in the United States
nurses give anesthetics. In Canada today they ordinarily do
1 Crits v. Sylvester et al. (1955) 3 D. L. R. 181.
2 Annual Report, Canadian Medical Protective Association, June 1960,
Ottawa, Can.
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neither one nor the other. An instance where a nurse anesthetist
was involved will be cited later, but that case is unique.
This is largely a matter of custom and usage, and of course
in the remote areas nurses in fact do have to administer emer-
gency anesthetics. The administration of anesthesia by nurses
is expressly prohibited by Statute in some Provinces, e.g., Sas-
katchewan, where in statutory regulations it is ordered:
Except in cases of emergency, general anesthetics shall only
be administered by a duly qualified medical practitioner.3
The Physician Anesthetist. Any physician may administer
anesthetics provided he is duly licensed to practice medicine by
the licensing body in his Province. These bodies are set up un-
der the Medical Acts of the various provinces. For example, the
College of Surgeons of British Columbia is incorporated under
the terms of "An Act respecting the Practice of Medicine and
Surgery." 4 Further to this, he must, as in most Institutions in
the United States, have been accorded anesthetic privileges by
the hospital in which he works. These are not held as a right,
and may be withdrawn by the hospital authorities under certain
circumstances.
Some Aspects of Canadian Tort Law as It Refers to Anesthetic
Malpractice
(a) The Quebec Civil Code and Stare Decisis in the Com-
mon Law Provinces of Canada.
Canada is unique, in that within one federation the codified
civil law operates in one province parallel with the uncodified
system of common law in the other nine provinces.
In Quebec, civil wrongs are termed "Delicts" or "Quasi-
Delicts" rather than torts,5 and are actionable as offending against
one or more of the Articles of the Civil Code. As Anglin, C. J.,
put it, "on the principles enumerated in Articles 1053, 1054 and
1055, depend practically the whole law of torts in Quebec." 6
The Quebec Civil Code is based essentially on the Code
Napoleon of France and, in principle, the Court assesses each
case on its merits, uninfluenced by prior decisions; in theory
precedent is unimportant.
In the common law provinces, the body of the law rests on
the principle of stare decisis, as in England and the United
States.
Thus it would seem that decisions arrived at in Quebec must
3 Regulations under Hospitals Standards Act (Saskatchewan), Gazetted
Sept. 1956.
4 Medical Act (1948), 2 Revised Statutes of British Columbia, C. 206.
5 Malpractice Liability of Doctors and Hospitals, by W. J. C. Meredith.
6 Anglin, J., quoted in Delicts and Quasi-delicts, 1923-47 (1948) C. B. R.
95, Meredith, W. J. C.
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1961
10 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
differ drastically from those reached in the common law prov-
inces.
In fact, the differences are more apparent than real. Fried-
mann has pointed out that a nominally rigid adherence to stare
decisis in the common law provinces is tempered by a mildly
venturesome habit of "distinguishing" unhappy precedents till
they cease to exist for practical purposes.7 He quotes Dunfield,
J., of the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland (1952)---"We are
not here to administer the law according to precedent; we are
here to do practical justice, guided in essentials by precedent.
The two attitudes are quite different. If precedent hinders prac-
tical justice, precedent should be stretched." This enlightened
view hardly coincides with the sentiments of Lord Eldon, who,
one hundred and fifty years before, said "It is better that the
law should be certain, than that every judge should speculate
upon improvements on it." 8
As Friedmann indicates, the Quebec Courts, in applying the
Civil Code, work under "a framework dominated by the common
law mentality and technique; . . . the highest appeal court for
the Courts of Quebec is the Supreme Court of Canada, a ma-
jority of whose members are trained in the common law; . . .
the technique of judgment of the Quebec Courts is closer to that
of the common law than to that of French law."
The result is that "on the whole, cases of deliberate de-
parture from precedent in Quebec are rare," and ultimately
there is a remarkable similarity in the workings of these two
parallel systems of jurisprudence.
In regard to stare decisis: in each province, courts are
bound by prior decisions of that court and courts of equal juris-
diction within the province. All courts are bound by decisions
of the Supreme Court of Canada, which is now the ultimate au-
thority.
At one time, Canadian courts were bound by the decisions
of coordinate and superior courts in England. This is no longer
so, but such decisions are still considered highly persuasive.
Judgments from other parts of the Commonwealth and from
American courts are persuasive to a lesser degree.
(b) Contributory Negligence. In some states the old com-
mon law rule still holds, whereby if the defendant can show
that some negligent act of the plaintiff has contributed to the
damage complained of, the plaintiff will lose his case. This is
not so in Canada. In. all Provinces, including Quebec, as in
-England,9 legislation provides for an apportionment of damages
if contributory negligence is shown. In Quebec, this is referred
to as the "Common Fault" doctrine.5
7 Stare Decisis at Common Law and under the Civil Code of Quebec
(1953), C. B. R. 723, Friedmann.
8 Sheddon v. Goodrich (1803) 8 Ves. 441.
9 Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act (1945), 8 and 9 Geo. 6, C. 28.
Jan., 1961
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(c) Consent. As elsewhere, a valid consent is needed before
administering an anesthetic.
We are unaware of any instance in Canada of anything
analogous to the Oklahoma case, 10 where a patient was given a
spinal anesthetic contrary to his expressed wishes.
There is little doubt, however, that the Canadian Courts
would take a very serious view of this. Commenting on the cir-
cumstances wherein a dentist extracted some teeth other than
those the patient desired removed, Estey, J., of the Supreme
Court of Canada said that it was for the patient to decide "What,
if any, operation shall be proceeded with." 11 He quoted with ap-
proval, the words of Garrison, J.:
No amount of professional skill can justify the substitution
of the will of the surgeon for that of his patient.
1 2
There was an instance of a patient who sued the sur-
geon, staff and resident anesthesiologists because of pneumo-
thorax developed after a brachial block. The case for the plain-
tiff was based in part on the claim that they were expecting the
surgeon to give the anesthetic. This was held by the Court to be
insufficient reason for allowing the claim. 13, 115 It is noteworthy
that many Canadian Hospitals use consent forms which are open
to objection as being too broad in scope. Adopting the attitude
that "too broad a consent is no consent at all," similar insitu-
tions in the United States usually have adopted a form of consent
which is extremely specific. 16
(d) Waivers of Non-liability.
In Quebec, many hospitals incorporate a clause in the form
of consent, absolving the doctors and hospitals from claims of
damage following treatment. It cannot be said that such releases
are absolutely valid-certainly not in cases of gross negligence,
but the law in Quebec on the matter is not completely settled.'
We are unaware of such releases being in use in the other
provinces.
(e) Sovereign Immunity.
Based on the ancient concept that "the King can do no
wrong" it was at one time the case that the Crown could
10 Woodson et al. v. Huey (1953), 2 C. C. H. Neg. Cases 284 (1953), 261
P. 2d 199 (Okla.).
11 Parmley v. Parmley and Yule (1945) 4 D. L. R. 81.
12 Bennan v. Parsonnet (1912) 83 N. J. L. R. 20.
13 A Legal Pot-pourri, Fisher, T. L. (1954), 70 Can. Med. Ass. J. 576.
14 Burk v. S., B., and K. (1951), 4 W. W. R. 520 (B. C.).
'5 Burk v. Starr et al. (unreported) Supr. Ct. of British Columbia (1952).
16 Medicolegal Forms with Legal Analysis. Law Department, American
Medical Association, 1957.
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not be sued in tort, as is still the case in some States, for example
Minnesota.
As against the Federal Government, provision is now made
for redress against a civil wrong committed by the Agents of the
Crown: "The Crown is liable in tort for the damages for which,
if it were a private person of full age and capacity, it would be
liable." 17
As against the provincial governments, the position varies.
In British Columbia, it is possible to present a Petition of Right
to the Attorney General. The Lieutenant Governor may sub-
sequently issue a Fiat, permitting the individual to seek a remedy
in the Courts.18
To our knowledge this has never been done in a malpractice
case. Most hospitals are incorporated in such a way that they
would be unable to escape their responsibilities by pleading im-
munity. The exceptions are hospitals run by the Department of
Veteran's Affairs and some few provincial mental hospitals and
tuberculosis sanitaria.
(f) Res Ipsa Loquitur.
This has been dealt with separately elsewhere. 19
(g) Statutes of Limitations.
Actions for damages are ordinarily prescribed after one year
in all provinces, including Quebec.4, 5 This may be compared
with the situation in the United States, where in some instances
the prescription period is as long as six years.20
In British Columbia, the relevant section of the Medical Act
reads: "No registered member of the college shall be liable ...
for negligence or malpractice by reason of professional services
. . . unless the action is commenced within one year from the
date when in the manner complained of, the professional services
terminated . . .. ,, 4
It will be noted that no distinction is drawn between negli-
gence and malpractice. There is variation between provinces, as
to when the twelve month period shall start to run. The pre-
scription period might well be extended however if the indi-
vidual could show that there had been assault or some fraudulent
concealment of negligence.
17 Crown Liability Act (1952-3), Statutes of Canada, 1-2 Eliz 2, C. 30.
Is Crown Procedure Act (1948), Revised Statutes of British Columbia,
C. 86.
19 Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Anesthetic Malpractice Cases in
Canada, Harland, J. H. (in preparation).
20 Law of Hospital, Physician and Patient, Hayt, E., Hayt L. R., Groeschel,
A. H., 2nd ed., Hospital Textbook Co., New York (1952).
Jan., 1961
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(h) The Corporate Practice of Medicine.
Unlike some jurisdictions in the United States, 21 some corpo-
rations cannot practice medicine in Canada. Only a real indi-
vidual registered with the provincial licensing body has this
privilege; nor is it extended to include the case of Clinics whose
members are registered practitioners. 22 The patient is billed by
the individual physician.
(i) Responsibility of others for the torts of the anesthesi-
ologist.
(1) The surgeon. In the general case, in Canada, as in the
States, there is no legal relationship between the surgeon and
the anesthesiologist. In particular, there is not now, nor ever
was a master-servant relationship existing between them.23 The
only instance where the Courts felt impelled to comment on this
relationship was in Ontario in 1945. Mr. Justice LeBel said:
No authority has been cited to me that holds as a matter of
law, that the physician is responsible for the negligence of
the anesthetist of his choice. It seems to me that the phy-
sician should always satisfy himself that the anesthetist is
duly qualified with the skill and experience necessary for
the performance of the professional services he undertakes
to perform; having done that, the physician or surgeon is
not responsible, as a matter of law, for any action or omis-
sion on the part of the anesthetist. 24
(2) The Hospital. In England, Hillyer's case,2 5 is the lead-
ing 'authority for the idea that the hospital is not responsible for
the professional activities of the physician.
The creation of the National Health Service in that Country
resulted in a situation, where in the general and most usual cir-
cumstances, the patient did not privately engage a physician
himself, had no free choice of physician and received no bill
from the physician. Under these circumstances the absence of
vicarious liability on the hospital's part became open to doubt.
The doctor was no longer a professional man, ultimately respon-
sible to no person other than the patient-he had degenerated
into an underpaid civil servant.
Hillery, J., in Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council,26 de-
21 Study on Corporate Practice of Medicine in the United States, American
Medical Association (1956).
22 Carruthers Clinic Ltd., v. Herdman (1956), 5 D. L. R. (2d) 492.
23 Legal Relationship between the Surgeon and the Anaesthetist, Harland,
J. H., and Mewett, A. W. (1959), 6 Canad. Anaes. Soc. J. 299.
24 Walker v. Bedard and Snelling (1945), 1 D. L. R. 529.
25 Hillyer v. Board of Governors of St. Bartholomew's Hospital (1909) 2
K. B. 820.
26 Collins v. Hertfordshire County Council (1947), 1 K. B. 598.
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cided, albeit with some hesitation, that the hospital authorities
were not vicariously liable for the negligence of a surgeon, who
was in their part-time employ. He based this on the fact that
the authorities, from lack of knowledge, could not give the sur-
geon orders regarding how his work should be done. He was of
the opinion, furthermore, that they could not tell him what to do.
Hiliyer's case has since been distinguished almost out of ex-
istence.27 . 28, 29 It is now fairly settled law, in England, that the
National Health Service is vicariously liable for the tortious acts
of physicians, of whatever seniority, working under it, whether
they work under a contract of service or a contract for services.
This was decided in Cassidy v. The Ministry of Health. Somer-
veil, L.J., said:
The principle of respondeat superior is not ousted by the fact
that a 'servant' has to do work of a skillful or technical
character, for which the servant has special qualifications. 28
Denning, L.J., said in the same case, in discussing vicarious
liability:
The reason why the employers are liable in such cases, is
not because they can control the way the work is done-
they often have not sufficient knowledge to do so-but be-
cause they employ staff and have chosen them for the task,
and have, in their hands, the ultimate sanction for good con-
duct-the power of dismissal ... I take it to be clear law, as
well as good sense, that where a person is himself under a
duty to use care, he cannot get rid of his responsibility by
delegating the performance of it to someone else, no matter
whether the delegation be to a servant under contract of
service, or to an independent contractor, under contract for
services ...
It has been said by no less an authority than Goddard, L.J.,
in Gold's case,27 that the liability for doctors on the perma-
nent staff depends on whether there is a contract of service
and that must depend on the facts of any particular case. I
venture to take a different view. I think it depends on this-
who employs the doctor or surgeon? Is it the patient or the
hospital authorities? If the patient himself selects and em-
ploys the doctor or surgeon, as in Hillyer's case, the hospital
authorities are, of course, not liable for his negligence be-
cause he is not employed by them.
In Roe's case it was also held that the Ministry of Health
were vicariously liable for their employee anesthesiologist.29 In
England, if the patient privately engaged the physician, the hos-
27 Gold v. Essex County Council (1942), 2 All E. R. 237.
28 Cassidy v. Ministry of Health: Fahrni, Third Party (1951), 1 All E. R.
574.
29 Roe v. Ministry of Health: Woolley v. the same (1954), 2 All E. R. 131.
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pital would however not be responsible for the doctor's negli-
gence. This is the ordinary situation in Canada, where the
anesthesiologist is almost always privately engaged by the pa-
tient or on the latter's behalf.
In Crits v. Sylvester,'30 Schroeder, J.A., indicated that the
hospital was not responsible for the privately engaged anesthesi-
ologist. He enunciated a further principle that had been stated
in Anderson v. Chasney: 31
The hospital cannot be held liable if the doctors thus em-
ployed [i.e., by the patient], fail to use the equipment it has
provided. It is too much to say that a hospital should em-
ploy overseers to ensure that the anesthetists and surgeons
of proved ability, who are privately engaged, use the ap-
pliances which are on hand.
(3) Intern and resident anesthesiologists. A Junior Anes-
thesiologist of this status would, of course, owe a direct duty of
care to the patient. The question as to whether vicarious re-
sponsibility for his negligence would lie with the hospital, his
general master or with the supervising anesthesiologist has never
arisen in Canada. The latter might well be considered the
'special' master of the resident, albeit not his employer. The
answer would depend on the facts, and would be contingent on
where immediate control of the resident was considered to be
vested.
There is sound English authority for saying that the Staff
Physician is not liable for the mistake made by the resident
doctor, if it involves 'routine' care. 32 However, although resi-
dents in anesthesia are chiefly occupied in administering anes-
thetics, it is open to question whether the courts would regard
an anesthetic as 'routine.' In the United States, in view of the
legality of the corporate practice of medicine in some States,
and the use of nurse-anesthetists, it is presumed that the ad-
ministration of anesthesia by a resident under supervision would
be quite reasonable. It would not be necessary for the anes-
thesiologist to be present in the room, since he is not personally
billing the patient. He might reasonably supervise the anes-
thetics in two or more rooms simultaneously. Some forms of
consent imply that the anesthesiologist is only working in a
supervisory capacity. 16 In Canada it is thought, however, that
where the patient is receiving a personal account from the anes-
thesiologist, if something went wrong during the procedure, his
absence from the scene might be difficult to explain: if it were
shown that at the material time he was occupied with another
patient, his position would be almost indefensible.
30 Crits and Crits v. Sylvester et al. (1956), 1 D. L. R. (2d) 602.
31 Anderson v. Chasney (1949), 4 D. L. R. 71.
32 Morris v. Winsbury-White (1937), 4 All E. R. 494.
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(j) Standard of Care.
Lord Hewart's summation of the standard of care the law
requires, has often been quoted in Canadian judgments:
If a person holds himself out as possessing special skill
and knowledge, and he is consulted as possessing such skill
and knowledge by, or on behalf of, a patient, he owes a duty
to the patient to use due caution in undertaking the treat-
ment .... He owes a duty to the patient to use diligence,
care, knowledge, skill and caution in administering the
treatment. No contractual relationship is necessary, nor is
it necessary that the service be rendered for reward . . .
The jury should not exact the highest or a very high stand-
ard, nor should they be content with a very low standard.
The law requires a fair and reasonable standard of care and
competence. This standard must be reached in all the mat-
ters above mentioned.
33
In an Ontario decision, Judge Advocate Schroeder had this
to say:
The practitioner "is bound to exercise that degree of care
and skill which could be reasonably expected of a normal,
prudent practitioner of the same experience and standing,
and if he holds himself out as a specialist, a higher degree of
skill is required of him than of one, who does not profess to
be so qualified by special training and ability." 
30
Plaxton, J., said in Crysler v. Pearse:
At the same time it is to be borne in mind that a surgeon
does not become an actual insurer: he does not undertake
that he will perform a cure, nor will be liable in negligence
because someone else of greater skill and knowledge would
have prescribed different treatment or operated in a differ-
ent way.3 4
It will be apparent that Canadian common law as it refers
to the topic under discussion is not very different from that in
most American jurisdictions. Relative to the number of cases
in American law reports, there is a relative paucity of material
in Canada. We will now proceed to briefly review the Canadian
cases.
The Cases in the Common Law Provinces
1. Hughston v. Jost (1942) Ontario High Court35
The plaintiff-patient sued the anesthesiologist because dam-
age resulted from the inadvertent injection of pentothal around,
rather than into, a vein in the arm.
3 R. v. Bateman (1925), 41 T. L. R. 557.
84 Crysler et al. v. Pearse (1943), 4 D. L. R. 738.
85 Hughston v. Jost (1943), 1 D. L. R. 402.
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The Court held that the accident was in effect a hazard in-
herent in the procedure. Hope, J., said that "reasonable, not
extraordinary care and diligence were required of a medical
man." At the time this accident occurred it was customary to
use pentothal in 5% strength. Nowadays it is the practice to use
a weaker solution-2 or 2.5% strength, which will rarely cause
damage to the tissues.
This was the first time that an anesthesiologist had been
sued in Canada, and sued alone. The surgeon was not a co-
defendant.
The accidental injection of pentothal into the tissue is not
an uncommon occurrence. It may be of interest to note that in
a recent English case, where the fact situation was similar, the
anesthesiologist was held liable in the trial court, largely be-
cause he failed to ask the patient if she felt any pain, when he
commenced injection. In the appellate court this decision was
reversed. Ormerod, L.J. said:
There are risks in most forms of medical treatment, and
anesthetics is certainly no exception. All one can ask of a
practitioner is that he should keep those risks to that mini-
mum, to which reasonable skill and reasonable care can re-
duce them. If he does this, no injury which occurs, how-
ever serious, will be actionable.36
2. Walker v. Bedard and Snelling (1945) Ontario High Court3 7
A patient was given a spinal anesthetic prior to removal of
the gall bladder; she collapsed and died before surgery was
commenced. The husband of the victim sued the surgeon and
anesthesiologist. The Court found for both defendants.
In a statement previously quoted Mr. Justice LeBel ruled
that the surgeon was not responsible, as a matter of law, for the
negligence of the anesthesiologist. The latter had in this instance
been unsuccessful in introducing the needle into the spinal canal;
this was subsequently accomplished by the surgeon. Whether
this fact implicated the surgeon in the administration of the
anesthetic was not dealt with.
The judge was a man of broad human sympathies, as is evi-
denced by his penultimate words:
I am convinced that there is little likelihood this action
would have been commenced, but for Dr. B's unsatisfactory
answers at the time of the inquest, and for an unfortunate
remark he made to the plaintiff on another occasion, prob-
ably when both parties were in an agitated frame of mind.
86 Williams v. North Liverpool Hospital Management Committee. The
Times, January 17th, 1959.
87 Walker v. Bedard and Snelling (1945), 1 D. L. R. 529.
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. . . It is a tragedy, accentuated almost to the breaking
point for a layman to lose his wife and the mother of his
children, and to be led to believe by unguarded words or
actions on the part of medical men, that her death may have
been caused by negligence or want of care and skill. It is no
wonder that a man has recourse to law in such circum-
stances.
The lesson that the physician, if not the attorney also, may
draw from this is obvious. Cave quis dicis, quando, et cui (Be
careful what you say, and where, and to whom).
3. Burk v. S. B. and K. (1952) British Columbia Supreme Court
In this case, the patient had injured a finger. This was set
right using the anesthetic technique of brachial block. Local
anesthetic is injected above the collar bone onto the first rib to
anesthetise the nerves running to the arm. An occasional, and
ordinarily harmless complication is a partial collapse of the lung
(pneumothorax) due to puncturing that organ with the needle.
This complication occurred in this case and the patient despite
a prompt and uneventful recovery sued surgeon, resident anes-
thesiologist and supervising anesthesiologist.
The Court found for all defendants. It was in effect held that
a pneumothorax is a hazard inherent in this procedure.
4. Crits v. Sylvester (1955), Ontario High Court (1): (1956),
Ontario Court of Appeals (30): (1956), Supreme Court of
Canada .3s
A five year old infant was burned about the face by an ether
explosion, just prior to tonsillectomy. The father sued the anes-
thesiologist, the surgeon and the hospital.
In evidence it appeared that the child was being anesthetized
with ether in a can, which led by a rubber tube to a valve at-
tached to a rubber tube inserted in the wind-pipe. (The Flagg
technique.) The child's color becoming unsatisfactory, the anes-
thesiologist filled a bag with oxygen and attached it to the tube
in the trachea, and, by inflating the child's lungs therewith, re-
stored the color to normal. While doing so he placed the tube
from the oxygen tank in the ether can. On preparing to resume
the administration of ether, he removed the bag from the tube
in the trachea at which point the explosion occurred, induced,
it is almost certain, by static electricity.
In the court of first instance, argument was advanced that
the failure to wear conductive shoes and the non-use of an inter-
88 Sylvester v. Crits (1956), 5 D. L. R. (2nd) 502.
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coupling device constituted negligence. The Court rejected this
point of view and found for all defendants.
In the appellate court, the plaintiff withdrew his case against
the surgeon and the hospital. Schroeder, J.A., in reversing the
decision as to the anesthesiologist, said:
It seems logical to assume that there would be an even
heavier concentration [of anesthetic mixture] around the
ether can while the oxygen was flowing into the can, and
was not being absorbed by the patient (emphasis supplied).
If any heat were generated in the vicinity of this heavier
concentration of gas, which admittedly is highly inflam-
mable, it does not require one to have the skill or knowledge
of an expert to know what the result would be
and later:
Has the defendant Sylvester given an explanation which is
as consistent with the absence of negligence, as with negli-
gence on his part? In my opinion he has not. I regard his
conduct, on which I base this finding, not as conduct involv-
ing a matter of technical skill and experience, but rather
as an omission to take proper precautions in circumstances
and in relation to a matter, as to which any sensible layman
is competent to determine, without the assistance of expert
evidence, whether such conduct was negligent or not.
With respect, we would point out that the "logical assump-
tion" made by the Court is predicated upon the false notion that
the patient "absorbs" the ether-oxygen mixture after the manner
of a sponge, thus removing it from the surrounding air. In fact,
even on exhalation, such a mixture remains highly explosive.
However, we can but speculate as to whether a clearer under-
standing on this point would have altered the finding of the
Court.
The anesthesiologist carried his case to the Supreme Court
of Canada, which upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal.
Considering the fact that the ether can had been placed only six
inches from the child's head, the Court accepted the expert testi-
mony that such a practice was reasonable. Rand, J., said:
The practice followed here was approved by Dr. Gordon
[a highly qualified expert witness] and it would be ex-
tremely dangerous for a Court to attempt, in such a matter
to proscribe a step for technicians, where their general ex-
perience approves it, and it is not clearly unnecessary and
unduly hazardous.
The Court felt, however, that allowing the oxygen to flow
into the can and so set the stage for an explosion, constituted an
unnecessary hazard and, for this reason, found for the plaintiff.
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5. The "Novacaine" Cases
(a) Bugden v. Harbour View Hospital.39 A doctor treating
a dislocated thumb, asked for 'Novacaine'-a local anesthetic-
and was in error given a solution containing epinephrine
(adrenalin or suprarenin). On injecting this into the hand, the
patient died. The doctor was not held liable, although he had
failed to read the label on the bottle.
(b) Pollard v. Chipperfield.4 0 In this Saskatchewan case,
the fact situation was very similar to the Nova Scotia case just
mentioned. In this instance, however, the surgeon was held
liable, because he had omitted to assure himself personally that
the drug he proposed to inject was the drug he had asked for.
Ducharme v. Royal Victoria Hospital et al.
4 1
, 42
This is, so far as we know, the only reported instance of a
case of anesthetic malpractice in Quebec.
In 1935 a patient was treated for a fractured leg. A compe-
tent nurse anesthetist gave a nitrous oxide anesthetic, during
the course of which the patient died. The case was heard before
the Superior Court in 1939 and the Court of Appeal in 1950. In
the latter instance Barclay, J., said:
[It was pled] that a nurse, an employee of the defendants
and under their orders, practiced and participated in the
giving of an anesthetic, contrary to law . . .
It is a very controversial question, not yet decided by the
Courts, as to whether or not the giving of an anesthetic by a
trained nurse under a doctor's orders, can be called the
"practice of medicine," . . . and it is not necessary to decide
that question in this case. If it did constitute the illegal prac-
tice of medicine, the nurse or hospital which employed her,
might be guilty of an infraction of the law . . . , but it has
no relation to the issue in this case, which is an action
founded in fault . . .
The learned trial Judge, apparently impressed by the evi-
dence of some of the doctors, agrees with the theory that the
employment of a nurse instead of a doctor as anesthetist is
a fault per se. I refer to it as a "theory," because it is quite
evident that it is one, and not a "fact," so far as the evidence
goes in this case.
In commenting on the expert testimony as to the pros and
cons of nurse anesthetists, he further said:
39 Bugden v. Harbour View Hospital (1947), 2 D. L. R. 338.
40 Pollard v. Chipperfield (unreported), but see (1952), 7 W. W. R. (N. S.)
596.
41 Ducharme v. Royal Victoria Hospital et al. (1938), 76 Que. Superior
Court 309.
42 Ducharme v. Royal Victoria Hospital et al. (1940), 69 King's Bench
(C. A.) 162.
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It is quite apparent [that] . . . we are in the realm of a
purely medical matter, in which medical opinion is divided
and that a Court is not justified in deciding as to which of
two medical opinions is correct. . . . To say that a doctor,
or a hospital, because they adopt one of two prevailing medi-
cal opinions rather than the other, is by that fact alone, at
fault, is something which I am not prepared to do.
In this case, it is apparent that nurse anesthetists were being
used in Montreal, at least as late as 1935, when the patient lost
his life. At that time, such a practice was not contrary to the law
in Quebec. I am informed however, by Dr. Alan Noble, the
present Director of Anesthesia at the Royal Victoria Hospital,
Montreal, that today all anesthetics in Quebec are administered
by physicians. This he believes resulted from changes in the
wording of the Medical Act.
43
Conclusion
Making allowance for the tenfold difference in population
between Canada and the United States, it is evident that litiga-
tion arising from anesthetic malpractice is very much less com-
mon in the former country. We have attempted to give some
of the reasons for this discrepancy.
The fact situations covered, with the possible exception of
that in Burk's case,15 can be paralleled by American examples,
but they have been briefly outlined. The principles of Canadian
tort law will in the main be familiar and the use of a different
system of jurisprudence in Quebec raises few difficulties.
Anesthetic malpractice is considered a faintly scatological
topic by one's medical colleagues, who fail to share an eccentric
but harmless passion for browsing in law libraries. Our interest
in the subject is that of a working anesthesiologist, whose legal
illiteracy is relieved only by a haphazard reading of the relevant
judgments. This paper is the result of those researches, and it
may be that we have been unnecessarily discursive, especially in
point of quoting some of the judgments rather extensively. We
have ventured to do so, however, since we are persuaded that
although most of the concepts and sentiments judicially ex-
pressed therein will be familiar, the exact manner of their ex-
pression probably is not. Although similar to opinions delivered
by the Courts in the United States, they may perhaps offer a
fresh perspective on some aspects of the topic under discussion.
Although, in our view, tort law, as it relates to anesthetic mal-
practice, differs in few significant respects between our two
countries, we hope that this article will prove of some interest to
the American reader, since even in things alike there is diversity.
43 Dr. Alan Noble, Personal Communication (1960).
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[Editor's Note: Associate Prof. of Law Alan W. Mewett of Queen's Uni-
versity, Kingston, Ontario, wrote the following Comment on Dr. Harland's
article: ]
Comment
Alan W. Mewett, LL.B., B.C.L., LL.M., S.J.D.
Perhaps I, as a lawyer, may be permitted to make one ob-
servation on Dr. Harland's paper which might be of general in-
terest. Liability of all "specialists" whether surgeons, anesthe-
tists, or general practitioners, depends upon their being found
guilty of malpractice, which, after all, merely means their doing
something which they should not do, or not doing something
which they should. While the courts decide whether or not the
specialist-in Dr. Harland's paper the anesthetist-has been
guilty of malpractice, the crucial problem is to determine the
criteria by which they can come to a decision.
By and large, the courts of the British Commonwealth have
consistently permitted the profession itself to determine its own
standards of professional conduct. If you are dealing with cases
of "professional" negligence, and if by "negligence" you mean
acting unreasonably in the circumstances, then obviously the
"profession" itself is the only body which can adequately de-
termine whether or not one of its members has been unreason-
able. The outsider (and in this context a judge or jury is as
much an outsider as anyone else) is patently inadequate to ex-
press any opinion on the reasonableness of something he does
not understand. The serious danger in this approach lies in the
"ganging-up" of the professional man to protect a colleague. Who
of us likes to testify, in effect, that a colleague has been un-
reasonable? And this is the result, even if he only says, "Well, I
myself would not have done that."
It is apparent that this danger has been realized in the
United States. Here, there is a marked tendency for the courts
to intervene and to impose their own standards of what is reason-
able. In short, to find a professional defendant liable because his
conduct seems, to the ordinary man who knows nothing of the
difficulties of the situation, unreasonable. This they have had to
do because of the refusal of expert witnesses to testify against a
colleague. The result is bound to be that the professional defend-
ant in the United States is much more likely to be found guilty
of malpractice than in other parts of the common-law world.
But is this not your own fault? We all realize that no one
likes to testify against a colleague. But each time you say a
colleague's obviously negligent conduct is not negligent, you are
forcing the courts to adopt this more stringent policy.
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